Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

Olivier Bos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the Linkage Principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.

Keywords: All-pay auction; war of attrition; number of bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (2012)
Working Paper: Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:34810

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