On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an asymmetric information economy having finitely many agents and states of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original initial endowments in precise directions.

Keywords: Asymmetric information economy; Aubin non-dominated allocation; Private core; Privately non-dominated allocation; Properness; Walrasian expectations allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-23, Revised 2011-11-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35060

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