Chinese Firms’ Political Connection, Ownership, and Financing Constraints

Isabel K. Yan, Kenneth Chan and Vinh Q.T. Dang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms.

Keywords: Political connection; investments; financing constraints; Chinese firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 G18 G31 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-tra
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Related works:
Journal Article: Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35221

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