Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?

Nicola Acocella (), Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Wilfried Pauwels

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we discuss possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.

Keywords: Social pacts; axiomatic bargaining; unions; issue linkage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Is There any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3584

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