The Cost of Social Pacts

Nicola Acocella () and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Social pacts, while improving macroeconomic performance, usually impose costs on unions. To facilitate the formation of such pacts, various substitutes can operate, such as the payment of transfers or, to some extent, the conservativeness of the government, union’s inflation aversion or political partisanship.

Keywords: Social pacts; side payments; conservativeness; partisanship; unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: THE COST OF SOCIAL PACTS (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3585

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