Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Kjell Hausken

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.

Keywords: Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36410

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