The political economy of development assistance: peril to government quality dynamics in Africa

Simplice Asongu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper assesses the effectiveness of foreign aid in improving government institutions in 52 African countries using updated data(1996-2010). Findings suggest development assistance deteriorates government quality dynamics of corruption-control, political-stability, rule of law, regulation quality, voice and accountability and government effectiveness. It is therefore a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who really care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for results.

Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B20 F35 F50 O10 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of development assistance: peril to government quality dynamics in Africa (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36543

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