Public Good Provision with Convex Costs

Luigi Senatore

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers a model of voluntary public good provision with two players and convex costs. I demonstrate that the provision of public good is higher in the sequential framework under fairly general conditions. This outcome shows that introducing convex costs may reverse under some condition the results of Varian ( 1994).

Keywords: Public Goods; Contribution Games; Private Provision of Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D0 H40 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36984

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