Asymmetric Cournot duopoly: game complete analysis

David Carfì () and Emanuele Perrone

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9]; already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) and some new algorithms using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a particularly interesting asymmetric case. The software wxMaxima is an interface for the computer algebra system Maxima. Maxima is a system for the manipulation of symbolic and numerical expressions, including differentiation, sets, vectors and matrices.

Keywords: Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly; Normal-form Games; Software algorithms in Microeconomic Policy; Complete Analysis of a normal-form game; Pareto optima; valuation of Nash equilibriums; Bargaining solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C7 D2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-com and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37093/1/MPRA_paper_37093.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37811/1/MPRA_paper_37811.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly: A Game Complete Analysis (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37093

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