The Arm's Length Principle and Tacit Collusion

Chongwoo Choe and Noriaki Matsushima

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The arm's length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. This paper examines the effect of the arm's length principle on dynamic competition in imperfectly competitive markets. It is shown that the arm's length principle renders tacit collusion more stable. This is true whether firms have exclusive dealings with unrelated parties or compete for the demand from unrelated parties.

Keywords: Transfer price; arm's length principle; tacit collusion; stability of collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-23, Revised 2012-03-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The arm's length principle and tacit collusion (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37295

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