The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We introduce the sequential equal surplus division for sharing the total welfare resulting form the cooperation of agents along a river with a delta. This allocation rule can be seen as a generalization of the contribution vectors introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys (2007) in the context of TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sequential equal surplus division.

Keywords: Amalgamation; Consistency; Fairness; Sequential Equal Surplus Division; Sharing a river (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D74 Q25 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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