Optimal design of intergovernmental grants in a dynamic model

Heng-Fu Zou ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper outlines a dynamic model with three levels of government: federal, state and local in the Stackelberg game structure with the superor government as the leader and all its subordinate governments the followers.It studies the optimal design of block grants and matching grants from both the federal government and the state governments to their numerous subordinate governments respectively as well as the optimal public expendtures and public capital stocks of different levels of government in the long run. Using specific form of utility function, we find that the optimal intergovernmental grants are very different between the level of federal government and state governments.

Keywords: Block grants; Matching grants; Public spending; Public capital stocks; Public investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H53 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37427/3/MPRA_paper_37427.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().