Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision

Kornpob Bhirombhakdi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This economic experiment initiates in evaluating a model's performance in predicting a decision. The reciprocity model is measured its accuracy rate in prediction and informativeness as aspects of the model's performance. Seventy-nine undergraduate students voluntarily joined the experiment. They made decisions contingently in designed situations as the first player in a dictator game and all roles in trust-share games. The study controls effects of choice set (equal split, competitive, and different social welfare choices) and framing effect. The result shows that the model has high performance in both prediction and informative. Furthermore, it shows an existence of the loss aversion behavior, and a significant relationship between decisions in the dictator game and the trustshare games. The study suggests that the more complicated model may not be marginally useful in predicting decision in the positive reciprocity situations.

Keywords: economic experiment; performance; reciprocity; trust-share game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 C71 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-for and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37468/1/MPRA_paper_37468.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision (2012)
Working Paper: Performance of a reciprocity model in predicting a positive reciprocity decision (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37468

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().