Voting Behaviour in a dynamic perspective: a survey

Marco Ferdinando Martorana ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Traditional rational choice theories of voting state that, in a scenario with positive voting costs, people will vote only when they are pivotal. This hypothesis is contradicted by the frequent observation of relatively high rates of electoral turnout. Over the last few decades, several approaches have been developed in attempts to explain the paradox of not voting and to define more realistic behavioural rules, both within the rational voter framework and in opposition to that paradigm. This study offers a critical review of bounded rationality-based dynamic models. This class of model seems to be more promising than previous models in that it offers results consistent with observed voting patterns and investigates voter choices while assuming that social processes develop continuously.

Keywords: voting behavior; bounded rationality; dynamic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D03 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37592

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