Gobierno corporativo, diversificación estratégica y desempeño empresarial en México
Corporate governance, strategic diversification and performance of firms in Mexico
Antonio Ruiz-Porras and
William Steinwascher
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We study the empirical relationships among corporate governance, strategic diversification and financial performance in Mexico. The study uses data from 99 non-financial firms listed in the BMV (Mexican Stock Market) during 2004. The main relationships found are: Firms which property is concentrated use to focus on the domestic market. Family businesses diversify their productive activities and their sources of income. There are no trends, regarding strategies and performance, related to the separation between ownership and control. When independent committees exist in the board of directors, firms diversify on a mean-narrow-spectrum sense.
Keywords: corporate governance; strategic diversification; performance; family ownership; boards of directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L20 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cse
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Gobierno corporativo, diversificación estratégica y desempeño empresarial en México (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3819
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