Fines for Failure to Cooperate within Antitrust Proceedings – the Ultimate Weapon

Konrad Stolarski

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse a powerful competence available to antitrust authorities in Europe in the form of the imposition of fines for the failure to cooperate within antitrust proceedings. While fines of that type are imposed in practice very rarely, the article considers the existing decisional practice of the Polish antitrust authority as well as the European Commission, and presents the way in which their approach has evolved throughout the years. The article analyses also the question of the formal initiation of proceedings concerning procedural violations and the importance of the use of a uniform and fair approach towards the scrutinized undertakings, especially as fine graduation is concerned. For that purpose, the article provides also a comparative analysis of past proceedings conducted by the European Commission and selected judgments of EU Courts.

Keywords: fines; antitrust proceedings; dawn raid; inspection; cooperation; procedural infringements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hme
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38523

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