Rentes et corruption au maroc théorie et evidence

Morocco rents and corruption theory and evidence

Mohamed Jellal () and Mohamed Bouzahzah

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper is part of a large research agenda by our Institute on the causes and consequences of moroccan corruption . This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the main determinants of firms corruption in Morocco firms in the formal sector. It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in explaining corruption. This endemic corruption can then explain the lack of productive performance of Moroccan firms. Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth.

Keywords: Corruption; firms; rents; favoritism; competition policy; morocco (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D73 K21 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38750

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