An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Koczy (2006), Yang (2010, 2011) and a previous result by ourselves (2012) in which the bound was n(n-1)/2.

Keywords: Core; Block; Weak dominance relation; Strong dominance relation; Davis-Maschler reduced games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (2013)
Working Paper: An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (2013)
Working Paper: An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (2013)
Working Paper: An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games (2013)
Working Paper: An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games (2012)
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