Cross-ownership, league policies and player investment across sports leagues

Kevin Mongeon and Jason Winfree

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Although many sports leagues are viewed as monopolies, research suggests that some economic competition exists between teams in dierent sports leagues. If fans make consumption choices based on the quality of all teams that are present in their region, then economic competition and ownership structure can impact an owner's incentive to invest in talent. This article examines dierences between monopolists, duopolists and cross-ownership. Consumer preferences and fan loyalty are allowed to vary across sports, and the winning percentages of teams in other leagues aects demand. Our model shows that economic competition results in an ambiguous level of investment compared to a monopolist. A rm that engages in cross-ownership will invest less in talent compared to a duopolist, but the dierence in prots is ambiguous. League policies are studied and are shown to aect the quality of teams in other leagues.

Keywords: Sports Leagues; Talent Investment; Ownership Structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39218/1/MPRA_paper_39218.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43233/1/MPRA_paper_43233.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39218

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().