Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different equivalence results. In addi- tion, several counterexamples state boundaries for the possibility of extending and generalizing our results.

Keywords: Bargaining sets; coalitions; core; veto mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D41 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-10, Revised 2012-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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