A new stationary game equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational Individual choice

Darong Dai and Kunrong Shen

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.

Keywords: Stochastic replicator dynamics; Rational choice; Normal-form game equilibrium; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40133

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