Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: a two-sided model

Frank Mueller-Langer and Richard Watt ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyse optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Second, we find that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) decreases journal profits but has ambiguous social welfare effects.

Keywords: Open access; academic journals; two-sided market; ambiguous welfare effects of removal of copyright (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L82 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-net and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-sided Model (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40191

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