More fair play in an ultimatum game after resettlement in Zimbabwe: A field experiment and a structural model

Stefan Kohler

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Zimbabwean villagers of distinct background have resettled in government organized land reforms for more than three decades. Against this backdrop, I assess the level of social cohesion in some of the newly established communities by estimating average preferences for fairness in a structural model of bounded rationality. The estimations are based on behavioral data from an ultimatum game field experiment played by 234 randomly selected households in six traditional and 14 resettled villages almost two decades after resettlement. In two out of three distinct resettlement schemes studied, the resettled villagers exhibit significantly higher degrees of fairness ($p ≤ 0.11$) and rationality ($p ≤ 0.04$) than those who live in traditional villages. Overall, villagers are similarly rational ($p = 0.30$) but the attitude toward fairness is significantly stronger in resettled communities ($p ≤ 0.01$). These findings are consistent with the idea of a raised need for cooperation required in recommencement.

Keywords: Africa; behavioral economics; inequality aversion; land reform; impact evaluation; social change; social development; social preferences; structural estimation; quantal response model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in PLoS ONE 8.5(2013): pp. e64791

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40248/2/MPRA_paper_40248.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: More Fair Play in an Ultimatum Game after Resettlement in Zimbabwe: A Field Experiment and a Structural Model (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40248

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().