Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening

Andrei Barbos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.

Keywords: Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D82 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Imperfect evaluation in project screening (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40847

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