Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation

Andrei Barbos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent, who owns a project of unknown quality, considers proposing it to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation that differ in the benefits they deliver to the agent upon acceptance of a project. The agent has to select the tier to which the project is submitted for review. Making a proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form of a submission fee. We examine the effect of a change in the submission fees at the two tiers of evaluation on the expected quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator.

Keywords: Evaluation; Project Screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40848/1/MPRA_paper_40848.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50281/1/MPRA_paper_40848.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Project screening with tiered evaluation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40848

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