Cournot tatonnement and potentials

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium as well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path.

Keywords: Cournot tatonnement; Cournot potential; game with structured utilities; aggregative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43188/1/MPRA_paper_43188.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59523/1/MPRA_paper_59523.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Cournot tatonnement and potentials (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:43188

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().