Equilibrium Vengeance

Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types survive and reap mutual gains.

Keywords: reciprocity; vengeance; evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium vengeance (2009)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Vengeance (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4321

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