Mathematical structures of simple voting games

Moshé Machover and Simon Terrington

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We address simple voting games (SVGs) as mathematical objects in their own right, and study structures made up of these objects, rather than focusing on SVGs primarily as co-operative games. To this end it is convenient to employ the conceptual framework and language of category theory. This enables us to uncover the underlying unity of the basic operations involving SVGs.

Keywords: Simple games; Lattice of simple games; Category (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Mathematical structures of simple voting games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:43939

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