Asymmetric and Non-atmospheric Consumption Externalities, and Efficient Consumption Taxation

Paul Eckerstorfer and Ron Wendner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the effects of a generalized class of negative consumption externalities (asymmetric and non-atmospheric) on the structure of efficient commodity tax programs. Households are not only concerned about consumption reference levels — that is, they gain utility from “keeping up with the Joneses” — they also exhibit altruism. Two sets of efficient tax regimes are compared, based, on a welfarist- and a non-welfarist optimality criterion, respectively. Altruism turns out not to be at odds with the consumption externalities. Rather, altruism implicates a bound on efficient utility allocations. A non-welfarist government tolerates less inequality than a welfarist one. In the welfarist (non-welfarist) case, first-best personalized commodity tax rates respond highly sensitively (barely) to whether or not a consumption externality is asymmetric or non-atmospheric. If personalized commodity tax rates are not available (second-best case), the tax rate on a non- positional good is typically different from zero for corrective reasons. For plausible functional forms and parameter values, numerical simulations suggest that second-best tax rates are rather insensitive with respect to both the optimality criterion and the “nature” of the consumption externality.

Keywords: Consumption externality; keeping up with the Joneses; optimal (commodity) taxation; genuine altruism; non-welfarist government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation (2013)
Working Paper: Asymmetric and Non-atmospheric Consumption Externalities, and Efficient Consumption Taxation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:45521

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