What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?

Rebel Cole and Hamid Mehran

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that: (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has almost exclusively focused; (ii) executives at C-corporations are paid significantly more than executives at S-corporations; (iii) executive pay is inversely related to CEO ownership; (iv) executive pay is inversely related to leverage; and (v) executive pay is related to a number of CEO characteristics, including age, education and gender. Executive pay is inversely related to CEO age and positively related to educational attainment. Finally, female executives are paid significantly less than their male counterparts.

Keywords: Compensation; Organizational Form; Taxes; Ownership; Education; Gende (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 H24 H25 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation? (2010)
Working Paper: What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4710

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