Rule Rationality

Yuval Heller and Eyal Winter ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).

Keywords: Bounded Rationality; Commitments; Categorization; Value of information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48746/1/MPRA_paper_48746.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61895/1/MPRA_paper_61895.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: RULE RATIONALITY (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48746

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().