Are Elections Debt Brakes? Evidence from French Municipalities

Aurélie Caseette and Etienne Farvaque
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Aurélie Cassette

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact is larger the higher the debt level, it compensates the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.

Keywords: Debt; Elections; Municipalities; Political Business Cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Are elections debt brakes? Evidence from French municipalities (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48808

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