Коррупция, демократия и регуляторная эффективность государства

Corruption, democracy and control effectiveness of the state

Irina Filippova

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The object of analysis is a state as a distributed system of decision making and the subject of analysis is its dysfunction as a result of action of institutional factors, in particular, corruption as an informal negative institute. The obtained results provide grounds for doubts in positive influence of democracy upon socio-economic processes, including upon the level of perceptible corruption. This suggests that democracy facilitates dispersion of responsibility and alienation of science from control, since scientific knowledge is not a “mass product” and becomes less and less demanded from the ruling elite in Ukraine. The function of the science as an institutional factor of effectiveness of state control lies in development of concepts of non-discretional mechanisms of decision making and also formulation of clear criteria for assessment of results of activity of subjects endowed with authority of decision making, in order to increase the level of their responsibility. Thus, we speak about such institutional factors of state control effectiveness as social responsibility and social control.

Keywords: effectiveness; institutes; state control; corruption; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 E02 H00 O15 O17 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013, Revised 2013
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Published in Problems of Economy / Проблемы экономики 2 (2013): pp. 102-107

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