Waiting to Cooperate?

Todd Kaplan, Bradley Ruffle and Zeev Shtudiner

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Sometimes cooperation between two parties requires exactly one to cede to the other. If the decisions whether to cede are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be avoided if a party can wait to see what the other does. We experimentally test whether adding a waiting option to such a two-player cooperation game enhances cooperation. Although subjects cede less overall with the waiting option, we show that they coordinate more and consequently achieve higher profits. Yet, a dark side overhangs waiting: the least cooperative pairs do worse with this option. They wait not to facilitate coordination but to disguise their entry.

Keywords: cooperation; endogenous timing; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: WAITING TO COOPERATE? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:50096

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