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Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity

David Gill, Victoria Prowse and Michael Vlassopoulos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. These results are consistent with workers’ cheating behavior responding to the perceived fairness of their employer’s compensation scheme.

Keywords: Bonus; compensation; cheating; dishonesty; lying; employee crime; productivity; slider task; real effort; experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J3 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Bonuses and Productivity (2012) Downloads
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