“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China

Ruilong Yang, Yuan Wang and Huihua Nie

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of these leaders increases with their economic performance measured as growth rate of operating revenue, while the likelihood of demotion decreases with their economic performance; (2) these leaders with CCP central committee member have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (3) these leaders with Ph.D. degree have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (4) compared to growth rate of operating revenue, growth rate of maintaining and increasing the value of state capital has no significant effect on promotion; (5) the compensation linked to position in CSOEs has no impact on leaders’ promotion, which indicates that leaders in CSOEs look more likely government officials rather than professional managers.

Keywords: state-owned enterprise; promotion; government officer; economic performance; guangxi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 J63 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-01, Revised 2013-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-tra
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Published in Management World (in Chinese) 3 (2013): pp. 23-33

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