Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system

Jamal Islam, Dr Haradhan Mohajan () and Pahlaj Moolio

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails.

Keywords: Median voter; Single-peakedness; Single-crossing and Top monotonicity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-11, Revised 2011-02-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Journal of Economics and Research 6.2(2011): pp. 111-125

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50696/1/MPRA_paper_50696.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:50696

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().