An effective replicator equation for games with a continuous strategy set

Matthijs Ruijgrok and Theo Ruijgrok

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The replicator equation for a two person symmetric game, which has an interval of the real line as strategy space, is extended with a mutation term. Assuming that the distribution of the strategies has a continuous density, a partial differential equation for this density is derived. The equation is analysed for two examples. A connection is made with Adaptive Dynamics.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; Replicator equation; Mutation; Dynamic stability; Partial differential equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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