Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program

Lorenzo Casaburi and Ugo antonio Troiano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. Two million buildings were registered as a result of the program. Our difference-in-differences identification strategy exploits both variation across towns in the ex-ante program scope to increase enforcement as well as administrative data on actual building registrations. Local incumbents experience an increase in their reelection likelihood as a consequence of the policy. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher speed of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and government efficiency.

Keywords: tax evasion; public economics; political economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti–Tax Evasion Program (2016)
Working Paper: Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52242

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