The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

Barna Bakó and Attila Tasnádi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly; Cournot; Bertrand-Edgeworth. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-15
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies (2017)
Working Paper: The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52986

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