Information Asymmetry and Power in a Surveillance Society

Geoffrey Lightfoot and Tomasz Wisniewski

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we look at how information in societies is organized and how power relationships arise as a consequence of this organization. We argue that many of the observed information asymmetries are not happenstance and, drawing from a wealth of scholarship from the economics and finance literature, we posit that outcomes are inevitably detrimental. The paper concentrates on the techniques that foster information imbalances, such as media and propaganda, knowledge production, educational systems, legal and organizational structures, exclusive information networks, and surveillance. We conclude that in the absence of greater transparency, the deleterious effects of unequal access to information will continue and deepen.

Keywords: Information Asymmetry; Power; Surveillance; Secrecy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 I31 O31 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58726/8/MPRA_paper_58726.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:53109

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