Almost orthogonal outcomes under probabilistic voting: A cautionary example

Jim Dolmas

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I illustrate by example a way in which equilibria under probabilistic voting are fragile with respect to assumptions about the non-policy components of voter preferences. I also offer intuition for the fragility using the social welfare functions which also describe the equilibria.

Keywords: Probabilistic voting; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:53628

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