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Political environment a ground for public sector corruption? Evidence from a cross-country analysis

Ajantha Kumara () and Wasana Sampath Handapangoda

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study employs the instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression approach for the data for 121 countries to explore the impact of a country’s political environment on its level of corruption. The study provides strong evidence that a higher degree of rule of law, press freedom, readiness and capacity to handle e-governance practices, and urbanization are associated with a lower level of public sector corruption across all 121 countries. The colonial dummies and having a presidential government are found to be valid instruments for rule of law in addressing the issue of endogeniety embedded in it. Further, to a certain degree, landlocked countries are relatively more corrupt than costal countries. Finally, policy implications are discussed based on the findings of the study.

Keywords: Corruption; Political Environment; Endogeniety; Public Sector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-22, Revised 2014-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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