Indirect taxes in oligopoly in presence of licensing opportunities

Neelanjan Sen and Rajit Biswas ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem tax in Cournot doupoly in the presence of licensing opportunities after the announcement of the tax rates by the government. Anderson et al. (2001) shows that in such a case ad valorem tax welfare dominates the unit tax. However, it ignores the licensing possibilities. Interestingly, it is shown in the present paper that in case of fixed-fee licensing unit tax sometimes dominates ad valorem tax. However, unit tax and ad valorem tax are equally efficient in case of royalty licensing.

Keywords: Unit tax; Ad valorem tax; Cournot Competition; Licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: Indirect Taxes in Oligopoly in Presence of Licensing Opportunities (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:55437

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