An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals

Robert Boylan, Richard Cebula (), Maggie Foley () and Xiaowei Liu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that shareholder proposals are excluded mainly due to sponsors’ lack of experience and knowledge, rather than as a self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain bargaining power or to simply annoy management. We also find that most shareholder proposals are omitted because they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.

Keywords: corporate governance; SEC Rule 14a; omitted shareholder proposals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Finance and Accountancy 1.17(2014): pp. 1-16

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Related works:
Working Paper: An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56659

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