Social structure bureaucracy and corruptionA

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the preferences of the supervisor. This result suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term social reciprocal relationships between public officials and potential bribery may be reduced by the means of bureaucratic staff rotation. Evidence from an experimental study supports this proposition and our theoretical finding.

Keywords: Principal-agent-supervisor; collusion; staff rotation; social structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D82 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-soc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57191/1/MPRA_paper_57177.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57177

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