Firmes industrielles concurrence et corruption

Industrial firms competition and corruption

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in fostering corruption. Therfore, this endemic corruption can explain the lack of productive performance of industrial . Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth

Keywords: Industrial Firms; Competition; Tax Evasion; Corruption; Rents; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H26 K2 K42 L1 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57284

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