A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players

Gaurab Aryal (aryalg@bu.edu) and Ronald Stauber

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

Keywords: Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; Dynamic consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players (2014)
Working Paper: A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57336

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