A model of technology transfer under taxation

Nickolas Michelacakis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a model to study the technology transfer decision of a monopolist, with access to a finite number of technologies, under taxation. It is shown that a policy maker in a low-wage developing country cannot always increase the number of technologies transferred from a developed country through a tax on wages-and-invest scheme. We provide conditions for such an intervention to be successful and show that there is no unique choice of tax for doing so.

Keywords: technology transfer; multinational; tax; model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 H21 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:58632

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