Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

Tarun Kabiraj and Srobonti Chattopadhyay

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence RJV incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers’ welfare, but the firms become worse off.

Keywords: Cooperative R&D; non-cooperative R&D; RJV; incomplete information; consumers’ welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ino and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:59259

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